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Introduction 
Three weeks before he was officially nominated as the Republican presi-
dential candidate in 2000, George W. Bush addressed the annual conven-
tion of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP). Knowing he faced a hostile audience (in 1983 its dele-
gates had booed and hissed when his father insisted that Republican 
policies benefited African Americans), Bush sought to disarm the crowd 
with humor, quipping that he had "a couple, maybe more than a couple" 
supporters among them. He then turned more serious and confessed that 
the "party of [Abraham] Lincoln has not always carried the mantle of 
Lincoln." But, the Texan insisted, the future could be different. He 
agreed that racism remained a serious national problem, pledged to vig-
orously enforce civil rights laws, and called for education reform, greater 
health care access, more home ownership, and help for religious organi-
zations that assisted "the suffering and hurting." A deeply religious man, 
Bush affirmed that the state should help the destitute but also insisted 
that such people "need[ed] what no government can provide, the power 
of compassion and prayer and love." Audience members remained leery. 
One, who had not voted for a Republican presidential candidate in 
nearly half a century, deemed Bush's ideas "a step in the right direction" 
but then observed, "Face it, they haven't done anything for US."l 
In contrast, the NAACP delegates warmly welcomed Bush's Demo-
cratic opponent, Vice President Albert Gore Jr., three days later. They 
cheered when Gore proclaimed himself a member of their organization 
and reeled off a list of federal policy prescriptions that included support-
ing affirmative action, protecting Social Security and Medicare from 
budget cuts, curbing racial profiling by law enforcement officers, and 
fostering economic development. Gore contrasted his religious views 
with Bush's by declaring that a person expresses faith through action, 
[ I ] 
[ 2] INTRODUCTION 
not rhetoric. Results, he argued, matter more than good intentions. The 
NAACP delegates' divergent responses to the two candidates foreshad-
owed Bush's winning a paltry 9 percent of the black vote in the Novem-
ber election.2 
That 91 percent of black voters cast their ballots for Gore is evidence 
that nothing separates the American electorate more than race. Black loy-
alty to the Democratic Party remains high across age, class, gender, na-
tional origin, and other demographic characteristics. Republican voters, in 
contrast, are overwhelmingly white. Since 1964, no Republican presiden-
tial candidate has attracted more than 15 percent of the black vote.3 
Two narratives dominate contemporary discussions of African Ameri-
cans and the Republican Party. One stresses that during the mid-196os 
and early 1970s, Republicans consciously abandoned their identity as the 
pro-civil rights "party of Lincoln" to woo whites, especially in the 
South, who were eager to preserve their political, economic, and social 
power in the face of challenges from the civil rights movement and fed-
eral authorities. In this view, race has played a decisive role in the nation's 
conservative turn since the late 1960s. A second interpretation, usually 
offered by Republicans themselves or by conservative activists, denies 
any transformation. Proponents of this view uphold the GOP as fighting 
to desegregate the South and protect black voting rights. They contend it 
was the Democratic Party that stood in the way of racial progress during 
the mid-twentieth century and continues to offer policies that harm 
black families and communities.4 
I offer a fresh look at the relationship between African Americans and 
the GOP. This book explores how Republicans at the federal level ap-
proached racial policy and politics between 1945 and 1974. Though the 
struggle for black equality existed before then and continues today, these 
three decades constitute a distinct era in that battle. African Americans 
and their allies grew more assertive in challenging the status quo. Some 
focused on direct action protests, while others primarily lobbied the fed-
eral government. Civil rights reformers demanded changes in economics, 
segregation, voting, housing, and other matters. Their struggle encom-
passed the entire nation, not just the South. The most prominent and in-
fluential reformers focused on removing racial distinctions from the 
law-they fought for a "color-blind" society. 
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The mid-1970S marked another turning point. Important legal victo-
ries had been achieved. Direct action subsided, as did the large-scale 
racial violence that had been so common in the second half of the 1960s. 
Controversies over whether the federal government would force the in-
tegration of suburban and urban schools and launch a massive new an-
tipoverty initiative receded. Most important, civil rights activists now 
championed "race-conscious" remedies for inequality. Though such 
thinking had been present in the earlier period, it took a backseat to uni-
versalist ideas that emphasized a common humanity. Celebrations of "di-
versity" began to supplant the "color-blind" model.S 
Between 1945 and 1974, Republicans exerted considerable influence 
over the timing and content of racial policy. The GOP's impact was evi-
dent at the White House, where Dwight Eisenhower and later Richard 
Nixon made important decisions. It was also at work in Congress. By 
focusing heavily on Congress, I aim to bring greater balance to a narra-
tive that has placed presidents and presidential contenders at center 
stage. 
Republicans' involvement differed from that portrayed by the two 
dominant narratives. They were not steadfast supporters of civil rights 
reforms prior to 1964. To be sure, Republicans did not speak with one 
voice, and at crucial moments they aligned with the NAACP and other 
prominent black leaders. More often than not, however, they were at 
loggerheads. Most Republicans opposed the reformers' agenda or were 
uninterested in race altogether. They usually saw little political advan-
tage in pressing for change. Their understanding of race, the role of the 
state, and American society was fundamentally different from that of 
most African Americans. Like their nineteenth-century forebears, Re-
publicans proved effective at minimizing the reach of federal authority 
into racial matters outside the South -or preventing it altogether. The 
reforms they did support applied almost exclusively to Dixie. 
Scholars who emphasize a sharp turn to the right after 1964 ignore or 
trivialize significant policy developments. During the early 1970s, civil 
rights activists felt embattled and dejected. Their differences with the 
GOP remained substantial, and policy clashes were frequently acrimo-
nious. Nevertheless, Republicans, especially those in the Senate, proved 
crucial to fending off attempts by conservatives (usually southerners) in 
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both parties to roll back reforms regarding education, voting, and em-
ployment. The Nixon administration launched several notable initiatives. 
Republicans supported measures their predecessors had rejected or never 
would have favored. The reform impulse of the I960s survived and was 
expanded on. The GOP adapted to a racial context different from that 
which had existed in earlier decades. The early 1970S offer an important 
reminder that shifts in party control of the White House do not necessar-
ily mean policy changes and that developments in Congress matter as 
much as, if not more than, presidential politics. 
I also explore the role race played in Republican politics. The GOP re-
mained the minority party throughout the period covered in this book. 
During the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats 
built a coalition of white southerners, factory workers outside the South, 
intellectuals, and African Americans. These diverse groups often quar-
reled, but their loyalty on Election Day meant that Democrats controlled 
both houses of Congress for almost the entire era covered in this book 
and held the White House for much of it. The GOP thus had to find new 
voters if it wanted to regain the dominance it had enjoyed before the 
New Deal. 
For thirty years, race played a prominent role in intraparty debates 
over how to do that. Some Republicans favored allying more closely 
with the civil rights movement as a means of rallying support from 
whites and blacks alike. Others considered that approach futile if not 
counterproductive. The latter faction usually prevailed. Liberal Republi-
cans· were small in number and wielded minimal influence over the 
party's direction. The GOP usually paid little or no political price for-
and indeed, benefited from - its lack of African American supporters. 
Between 1945 and 1974, civil rights leaders' recurring claims that blacks 
constituted the "balance of power" on Election Day often proved greatly 
exaggerated. 
This book is about men who held or sought power and how they dealt 
with racial issues from those positions of influence. It speaks to two im-
portant topics in post-World War II American history: the struggle for 
racial justice, and the development of the Republican Party. The Republi-
can Party shaped the modern African American freedom struggle. That 
fight also transformed the GOP. 
Fair Employment Practices Commission, 
Voting Rights, and Racial Violence 
On February 4, 1945, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British 
prime minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet general secretary Joseph 
Stalin convened in Yalta. With victory against Germany and Italy immi-
nent, they had gathered to make plans for the political and economic fu-
ture of Europe.! 
The degree to which government would shape the postwar order 
stood at the center of domestic politics too. Roosevelt's New Deal had 
expanded federal authority over economic activities. Though many 
Americans despised the president, millions adored him and believed the 
New Deal had created a more just society. African Americans were 
among the latter. The New Deal reinforced and expanded racial discrimi-
nation, but it also brought jobs, education, improvements in health, and 
attention from prominent members of the administration. African Amer-
icans saw the federal government as a positive force. 
As blacks looked ahead to the postwar era, they believed further assis-
tance from Washington would be necessary for economic opportunities, 
voting rights, and protection from violence. They would be sorely disap-
pointed. Southern Democrats, who wielded considerable power in Con-
gress, continued to block federal efforts for racial change. So, too, did 
Republicans, who viewed the world very differently from African Amer-
icans and felt no compelling reason to woo black voters. 
[ 5 ] 
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The Battle for Fair Employment Legislation 
The day after Roosevelt arrived in Yalta, Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) 
introduced a bill to create a federal fair employment practices commis-
sion (FEPC). This five-member body would investigate individual com-
plaints of job discrimination, establish regional committees, undertake 
studies, and work with employers and labor unions to ensure that race, 
ethnicity, and religion would not be factors in hiring, firing, compensa-
tion, and other decisions. The commission would have no enforcement 
powers; it would rely on persuasion and negotiation. In the parlance of 
the day, it was known as a "voluntary" commission. Because discrimina-
tion might well function differently in various parts of the country, Taft 
argued, solutions should vary accordingly. The first step was to study 
those regional differences.2 
Taft's words and actions commanded attention. The son of former 
president William Howard Taft, he had graduated first in his class at Yale 
and then at Harvard Law School. He had been elected to the Senate in 
1938 and quickly became the leader of the conservative coalition of 
southern Democrats and Republicans, formed in opposition to the New 
Deal. As far as Taft was concerned, the United States was already well 
down the road to socialism. Government officials were exerting influ-
ence ov~r wages, prices, and other matters that should be reserved for 
business executives and markets.3 
The senator found the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) par-
ticularly troublesome. Created in 1935, the NLRB had the authority to 
protect workers' right to join unions and thereby engage in collective 
bargaining with employers. It helped facilitate a dramatic rise in union 
membership. By the mid-I940S, unions had negotiated wages, benefits, 
and work rules that previous generations of laborers and managers 
would have found unimaginable. Most union members saw the federal 
government as their ally and credited the Democrats for these gains. 
Most business leaders, in contrast, detested the NLRB and unions. They 
wanted to set the terms of employment, and they believed that unions 
encouraged workers to see their bosses as greedy adversaries rather than 
benevolent allies. In management's eyes, class conflict had, with govern-
ment assistance, replaced the harmonious labor relations of earlier eras. 
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Business leaders wanted to hold labor's power in check or roll it back to 
pre-New Deallevels.4 
Given Taft's opposition to federal involvement in labor affairs, his 
sponsorship of FEPC legislation appeared to be a contradiction, but the 
senator thought otherwise. "In many places, [African Americans] are the 
last to be employed and the first to be laid off," he acknowledged. "Cus-
tom and prejudice interfere with improvement in their position." Taft 
believed discrimination constituted an artificial barrier that could keep 
an individual from making the most of his or her abilities.5 
Taft's bill reflected recent trends. World War II had made race a 
prominent issue in public discussion and popular culture. American 
propaganda countered Nazi theories of white supremacy by highlighting 
themes such as democracy, equality, and opportunity. Universalist ideas, 
which aimed to replace a belief in racial hierarchy with a standard of law 
and custom that emphasized a common humanity, had gained strength. 
Taft's committee resembled the many state and local agencies created 
during the war to foster harmonious intergroup relations. These bodies 
typically appealed to conscience and morality while arguing that preju-
dice was un-American. Several states in the North and West were even 
considering some sort of antidiscrimination employment policy. Finally, 
Taft's legislation grew out of developments in management. Many corpo-
rations continued to refuse to hire blacks and other minorities or rele-
gated them to the least desirable, lowest-paying work; they often 
justified their actions by citing concerns that white employees might en-
gage in violence or other work disruptions rather than accept black 
coworkers. Yet business executives were not monolithic. Wartime rheto-
ric, as well as labor shortages and pressure from civil rights activists, had 
led some to seek expanded opportunities for African Americans. Busi-
ness leaders wanted to control this process.6 
Taft hoped to preserve that autonomy by heading off "compulsory" 
FEPC legislation. Although voluntary and compulsory FEPC models 
shared several characteristics, they differed regarding enforcement. If a 
compulsory FEPC found evidence of discrimination, it could, like the 
NLRB, issue a cease-and-desist order enforceable by a federal court, 
thus compelling businesses and unions to change their behavior. Penal-
ties for noncompliance might include fines or the mandatory hiring or 
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promotion of the individual who had filed the complaint (perhaps with 
back pay), or some other affirmative step. 
Compulsory FEPC advocates distinguished between prejudice and 
discrimination. Government could not force an individual to hold partic-
ular beliefs (prejudice), but it could, through the threat of punishment, 
prevent him or her from acting on those beliefs (discrimination). Accord-
ing to Congresswoman Mary Norton (D-N.J.), a sponsor of compulsory 
FEPC legislation, intent to discriminate was evident in union contracts, 
job advertisements in newspapers (which often expressed a preference 
for "white" or "colored" workers), and payroll records. Norton also be-
lieved discrimination could be proved through "an employer's pattern of 
rejections or statements made by personnel officers."7 
The drive for a compulsory FEPC had begun in 1943 with the cre-
ation of the National Council for a Permanent FEPC. It consisted of 
unions, civil rights groups, and liberal religious organizations (primarily 
Jewish and Catholic) that supported the New Deal. Left-wing groups, 
such as the Socialist and Communist Parties, also favored a compulsory 
FEPC. Few Republicans or conservative organizations were involved, al-
though Senator Arthur Capper (R-Kans.) was an honorary cochair with 
Senator Robert Wagner (D-N.Y.), a longtime labor ally. The council 
wished to make permanent the temporary FEPC created in 1941 by 
Roosevelt's executive order. The wartime FEPC had inspired civil rights 
reformers to question the status quo and look to federal authority for as-
sistance, but it opened few jobs for African Americans.8 
Reformers believed results would be different under a permanent, 
c~mpulsory FEPC. Decades of moral suasion had been found wanting, 
according to A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping 
Car Porters (an African American union). Randolph believed that em-
ployers mouthed pious phrases about opportunity but then failed to act. 
For him, protest and pressure mattered more than talk. Recent employ-
ment gains among African Americans had come largely from the enor-
mous demand for wartime labor, and reformers feared blacks would 
suffer extensive postwar job losses, as they had after World War I. A 
compulsory FEPC would minimize layoffs or ensure that they were 
made without regard to race.9 
Reformers also regarded a compulsory FEPC as part of a larger strug-
FAIR EMPLOYMENT, VOTING RIGHTS, AND RACIAL VIOLENCE [9] 
gle in which government would intervene in the employer-worker rela-
tionship to provide greater protections and wealth for labor. FEPC pro-
ponents drew inspiration from Roosevelt's 1941 "Four Freedoms" 
speech, which included "freedom from want" as a basic right for all citi-
zens. Freedom, they believed, had a material component. This contrasted 
sharply with Taft's definition of freedom as the ability to live with mini-
mal government regulation. lo 
Taft had other differences with compulsory FEPC advocates. The sen-
ator was convinced that few people understood the radical implications of 
a compulsory FEPC. The agency would be "bound by no rules of evi-
dence," he claimed, thus allowing government to run roughshod over 
business. Whereas compulsory FEPC proponents insisted that discrimi-
nation was relatively easy to discern, Taft found it a nebulous concept, es-
pecially in a legal setting. How did one prove that an employment 
decision was based on discrimination rather than on a job candidate's 
qualifications or the lack thereof? Noting that anyone who failed to get a 
job or a promotion could claim to be a victim of discrimination, Taft 
feared there would be "thousands of lawsuits" against employers. He 
postulated that an employer could avoid these "harassing suits" only by 
"[choosing] his employees approximately in proportion to the division 
of races and religions in his district." Warning that "race and religion will 
enter into every decision," the senator foresaw a world in which 
"Catholic institutions ... will have to employ Protestants" and "white 
waiters and porters could insist upon most of the work in the Pullman 
sleepers and dining cars." Taft believed that mixing people who did not 
want to be mixed would lead to "more bad racial and religious feeling" 
and would" do the colored race more harm than good."l1 
The senator was especially worried that federal efforts would provoke 
violence. "You can pass some legislation, but if you go forward too 
quickly, reaction will set in," he had told the Afro-American (a black 
newspaper chain) in May 1944. "When you pass some laws you are liable 
to run into race riots." Taft saw prejudice as a fundamental part of hu-
man nature that had "existed from the beginning of time" and would 
"likely continue to exist." Change was not impossible, but it required a 
soft approach and would come slowly.12 
Taft was undoubtedly referring to the considerable racial conflict that 
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had occurred in both the North and the South. Most whites wanted to 
keep African Americans out of their neighborhoods, schools, and work-
places. Riots had broken out in Harlem and Detroit, but smaller racial 
clashes also occurred. In March 1943,2,000 women at a rubber plant in 
Detroit walked off the job to protest plans for integrated bathrooms. 
Two months later, white dockworkers in Mobile, Alabama, attacked 
blacks after hearing that twelve of them would be promoted to welders; 
the melee occurred even though the African Americans would be kept 
segregated.13 
A year later, 8,000 white workers at the Philadelphia Transit Company 
brought public transportation to a halt when they went on strike to 
protest management's decision-made under pressure from the FEPC 
and other federal agencies-to hire eight blacks as motormen and con-
ductors. Claiming they were being discriminated against, whites saw fed-
eral intervention on behalf of blacks as a threat to their job security. 
White and black leaders in Philadelphia worked feverishly to avoid vio-
lence; there were a few incidents, but no widespread rioting. Alarmed 
that war production at the city's factories was suffering, federal officials 
brought in troops to run the streetcars, trolleys, and buses. The union 
went back to work after five days. This and other "hate strikes," which 
occurred in Detroit, Portland, and elsewhere, were the latest incidents in 
a long history of workplace conflict between blue-collar whites and 
'blacks outside the South.14 
Taft's 1945 proposal meant that a compulsory FEPC had no chance of 
being enacted. Reformers had hoped to build a coalition of Republicans 
and nonsouthern Democrats, but GOP support was now unlikely. Sen-
ate convention held that legislators followed their leaders' wishes. A law-
maker won a pork-barrel project, gained a seat on a desired committee, 
or rallied votes for a piece of legislation by toeing the party line. Maver-
icks found themselves ostracized; they could deliver speeches but little 
else for their constituents. IS 
Activists were angry with Taft for other reasons. They believed bold 
government action would reduce racial tension and prevent violence. 
Members of the Cincinnati branch of the NAACP charged the senator 
with betraying earlier positions as well as the GOP's 1944 platform 
pledge; Taft vigorously denied both allegations. The senator's warning 
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about proportional hiring, they protested, was not only factually incor-
rect but also "a deliberate attempt to incite misinformed opposition." 
Discussion of fair employment practices as a zero-sum game in which 
blacks gained jobs at whites' expense had to be squashed. 16 
Reformers were especially troubled by Taft's comments, offered to 
civil rights representatives during a private meeting on February 2, that 
blacks should be pleased with their progress and should not demand jobs 
where they were not wanted. Accusing him of "temporizing and in-
dulging prejudice," they pointedly asked him in a follow-up letter, "Did 
it ever occur to you that all Negroes are not satisfied with being porters 
and waiters, and that some might desire to be train engineers, but for 
racial discrimination, which bars them?" Roy Wilkins, editor of the 
NAACP's journal The Crisis, suspected that Taft did not understand the 
extent of discrimination. He told the senator that study of the issue was 
"far behind the times because all Negroes, even illiterate ones, are cog-
nizant that discrimination exists" and believe "persuasion is of no avail." 
Enforcement powers were essential, Wilkins added, because African 
Americans had neither the time nor the money to file private lawsuits 
and wait for the courts to actY 
The NAACP put the onus for change squarely on the GOP. "The 
hatchet is out and it is not in the hands of [southern Democrats] ... but 
in the aristocratic fingers of the distinguished senator from Ohio," The 
Crisis editorialized. Unless the GOP backed a compulsory FEPC, "Ne-
groes cannot do other than consider the Republicans unfriendly to their 
basic necessity of earning a living." The NAACP was officially nonparti-
san, although its leaders had established close ties with several nonsouth-
ern Democrats in the 1930S. Taft's relationship with the national 
organization was chilly at best; in 1944 he had denounced "the NAACP 
Communists" who had "sold themselves to the New Deal."18 
Few Republicans proved willing to support an FEPC. GOP members 
of the House Rules Committee cooperated with southern Democrats to 
block Norton's compulsory FEPC bill. Nearly all legislation in the 
House required approval from the committee to be eligible for debate by 
the full body. Norton filed a discharge petition in April, but by Decem-
ber, just 50 of the 190 House Republicans had signed it. The petition re-
mained roughly 5 ° signatures short of the 218 needed to pry the bill 
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from the committee. Republicans in both the House and the Senate, 
meanwhile, allied with southern Democrats to pass legislation that ended 
funding for the wartime FEPC beyond June 30, 1946.19 
Southern Democrats launched a filibuster when a compulsory FEPC 
measure came up in the Senate in February 1946, bringing the upper 
house to a standstill. The filibuster and the reaction to it represented a 
test of lawmakers' determination to pass or defeat a bill. Two options ex-
isted for ending a filibuster. Leaders could try to wear out participants by 
keeping the Senate in session around the clock, but members of both par-
ties considered this taboo because so many legislators were quite elderly. 
The other alternative was cloture, by which two-thirds of those present 
and voting could halt the debate. The Senate had adopted cloture in just 
four of the twenty-one attempts since Rule XXII, the filibuster rule, had 
been implemented in 1917; it had never been achieved on a civil rights 
bill. Cloture failed this time, too - by eight votes. Although twenty-five 
Republicans voted for cloture, eight opposed it, and five did not vote.20 
A vote for cloture was not a vote for a compulsory FEPC. A senator 
could favor ending the debate but then vote against the bill itself. Wilkins 
accused both parties of timidity. "The record made by the Republicans is 
nothing about which the party can boast," he wrote to Republican Na-
tional Committee (RNC) chair Herbert Brownell Jr. The Crisis insisted 
the compulsory measure would have passed if the White House and con-
gressional Republicans had wanted it.21 
Battles over an FEPC occurred regularly over the next several years. 
Several northern Democrats pushed for a compulsory body, and Harry 
Truman, who became president when Roosevelt died in April 1945, of-
fered rh~torical support. Though Truman privately harbored racist 
views, he believed in equal opportunity, was sincerely troubled by vio-
lence against African Americans, and recognized that blacks constituted 
a core Democratic constituency. The president did little to prod congres-
sional Democrats to act, howeverY 
Since the days of slavery, southern Democrats had fought diligently to 
keep federal authority out of the region's labor market. They had blunted 
the impact of New Deal labor and social welfare legislation, such as the 
Fair Labor Standards Act and the Social Security Act, by demanding 
provisions that limited the laws' applicability to blacks or excluded them 
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altogether. Eager to preserve their region's low-wage, racially hierarchi-
cal labor structure, southern Democrats filled the Congressional Record 
with sharp denunciations of an FEPC.23 
Republicans spoke far less frequently, but what they said revealed im-
portant beliefs about race and American society. A few Republicans en-
dorsed a compulsory FEPC. Senator Wayne Morse (R-Ore.) had seen 
discrimination firsthand while serving on the War Labor Board during 
the early 1940s. Born in Wisconsin, Morse stood squarely in the tradition 
of Robert La Follette, the state's early-twentieth-century progressive 
Republican governor and senator. Morse displayed a fierce independence 
throughout his career. During the 1946 filibuster, he urged Senate leaders 
to demand around-the-clock sessions. Soon after cloture failed, he pub-
licly condemned the "legislative tyranny of a willful minority." Out of 
step with most of his GOP colleagues on labor, race, and several other is-
sues, Morse became a Democrat in the mid-1950S.24 
Irving Ives of New York was another Republican champion of a com-
pulsory FEPC. Before being elected to the Senate in 1946, he had been 
chair of the New York Temporary Commission against Discrimination 
and had led the successful struggle in 1945 for a compulsory FEPC in the 
Empire State. A former insurance and banking executive, Ives was the 
founding dean of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations at Cornell University. He personified a new perspective in 
management theory-one that was less hostile toward government and 
looked to promote more harmonious labor-management relations. "The 
right to earn a living regardless of one's race or religion or national origin 
or ancestry is inherent in our American Creed," he proclaimed. Ives's 
language reflected the influence of Gunnar Myrdal's famous 1944 book 
An American Dilemma. Myrdal posited that the gap between the na-
tion's ideals of freedom and opportunity and the realities of racial op-
pression could be overcome, primarily through enlightened leadership 
from elites. Throughout his twelve-year Senate career, Ives regularly 
worked with liberal Democrats, most notably Senator Hubert Humphrey 
(Minn.), on the FEPC and other civil rights matters.25 
Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.) also advocated a compulsory FEPC. Elected to 
the House in 1946, he served three terms. After a brief stint as attorney 
general of the Empire State, he was elected to the Senate in 1956 and re-
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mained there until 1981. A Jew who strongly believed that government 
could help the less fortunate, Javits might well have been a Democrat. 
However, he saw the Democrats as a southern-based party that op-
pressed blacks, favored the prohibition of alcohol, and was hostile to im-
migrants; the latter two positions were decidedly unpopular on the 
Lower East Side of New York City, where Javits grew up. The rampant 
corruption in the city's Tammany Hall political machine, which Demo-
crats controlled, also pushed J avits into the GOp. 26 
The New York FEPC stood as a source of pride for proponents of a 
compulsory federal FEPC. In 1947 Ives proclaimed it a success because 
none of the 752 allegations of discrimination it had investigated in the 
past year had wound up in court; all had been either settled amicably 
through negotiation or dismissed. For Ives, this was powerful evidence 
that claims that an FEPC would foster discord were erroneous. Over the 
next three decades, liberals in both parties would similarly portray the 
North as making racial progress through enlightened public policyY 
Whereas Taft and other critics of a compulsory FEPC regarded Nazi 
Germany as a dramatic reminder of the dangers of a powerful state, advo-
cates drew different lessons from the war. According to Senator H. 
Alexander Smith (R -N.J.), blacks had proved themselves in the military 
and deserved equal opportunities in the postwar era. Noting Hitler's the-
ories of white supremacy, he asked, "Shall we find that while we have 
conquered this false ideology by force of arms, we have ourselves been 
overcome by this same false thinking?" The United States could win the 
allegiance of nonwhites, who made up two-thirds of the world's popula-
tion, by promoting equal opportunity and living up to the ideals of the 
Declaration of Independence. Smith saw these issues in terms of Ameri-
can exceptionalism. "Is not equality of opportunity the eternal truth that 
America, the New World, has given to the Old World?" he asked. Racial 
or ethnic hatred, and the violence that might result, took on new meaning 
in a world where atom bombs existed. "We have come to a new age of hu-
man history," Smith announced, "where tolerance and the goal of human 
understanding must be our objective if the human race is to survive."28 
These were minority views, advocated by only a handful of lawmakers 
who stood on the margins of power within the GOP and Congress. 
Most Republicans wanted no FEPC whatsoever. Some regarded it as an 
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overwrought response to a minor or even nonexistent problem. Insisting 
that he had long worked for black advancement in his community, Sena-
tor Albert Hawkes (N.].) announced that during his seventeen years as 
president of a chemical company, racial friction had never been a serious 
matter in his plants. Senator Alexander Wiley (Wis.), who had served as 
district attorney in a small town with few African American residents, 
proclaimed his own racial innocence and that of his constituents. "I 
come from a state," he proudly declared, "where there has been little or 
no prejudice." Staunch New Deal critic Clare Hoffman (Mich.) noted, "I 
have seen so little discrimination in my community that it is difficult for 
me to realize that some of the statements mad_e by advocates of this sort 
of legislation are factual. "29 
Republicans believed government intervention was not needed and 
might make racial problems worse. In their view, employers were benev-
olent figures who would immediately correct inequities once they be-
came aware of them. Hawkes recalled that when he discovered that some 
black workers were making ten cents an hour less than whites, despite 
performing at the same level, he met with supervisors to equalize pay 
rates. "That shows what can be done by education and being on the 
ground," he affirmed. Like Taft, Hawkes considered a compulsory 
FEPC a form of social engineering that was destined to fail. "Neither 
you nor I can make things move any faster than the human family can 
absorb them," he maintained. The rapid influx of large numbers of black 
employees would, he feared, spark white violence. "No employer," he 
declared, "had the power to put into a plant a given number of people 
who were distasteful to those in the plant, and make them all get along 
together. "30 
Viewing an FEPC through the lens of the New Deal, Republicans 
crafted a historical narrative that emphasized a steady loss of employers' 
freedom. Senator Wallace White (Maine) worried that federal power had 
to be checked "if our America is to be saved." "If this bill were enacted 
into law, it would be another nail in the coffin of free enterprise," 
Hawkes lamented. "We have already put many nails in the coffin in 
preparing it for the burial of free enterprise. The patient is not yet dead, 
but he is extremely sick and all that is needed to finish him is a few more 
doctors." Business leaders, Hawkes reported, were "very weary and 
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tired" after a decade of government regulation of wages and prices and 
higher taxes; further regulation would leave the United States a "second-
rate nation." A compulsory FEPC would establish "an army of examin-
ers ... to harass and badger busy men to such a degree as to prevent the 
successful operation of their businesses. "31 
Wiley similarly described an FEPC as "a dangerous instrument for 
statism." Citing the hundreds of letters he had received from business 
leaders denouncing the Office of Price Administration, a wartime agency 
that had controlled prices and rationed many products, Wiley inquired, 
"Shall we create a government Gestapo which will make life perfectly 
miserable for the men who produce and create and build?" For Wiley, 
business, not government, drove progress. The senator forecast that the 
FEPC would, like the Works Progress Administration in the 1930S, be-
come a vehicle by which self-serving government officials dispensed un-
productive jobs in return for votes.32 
FEPC opponents drew another parallel with the 1930S. The NLRB, 
critics routinely charged, was neutral only in theory. Through their 
Democratic allies in government, unions had seized control of a federal 
regulatory body and used it to further their own narrow ends. Manage-
ment carried no weight with NLRB officials. A compulsory FEPC 
would, Hoffman protested, empower "professional reformers" who 
would "exercise their professional talents as creators of unrest." It would 
lead to "punishm~nt imposed by some bureaucrat, by some partisan, by 
some crackpot." According to Congressman Charles Halleck (Ind.), a 
compulsory FEPC would be "judge, jury, as well as investigator."33 
Republican critics insisted that a compulsory FEPC would inevitably 
lead to a racial spoils system. This was not a new controversy. Some civil 
rights activists during the 1930S had called for racial proportionalism in 
employment. Courts wrestling with the dilemma of how to prove dis-
crimination considered the issue, and some New Deal agencies had 
adopted numerical targets for minority hiring.34 
Republicans maintained that proportionality meant that white work-
ers, not just white managers, would be treated unfairly. A compulsory 
FEPC "would discriminate against a man simply because he was a mem-
ber of a majority rather than a minority," Wiley noted. Better-qualified 
whites, he asserted, would' lose their jobs or fail to be hired in the first 
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place as firms sought to boost black employment to avoid lawsuits or 
federal oversight. These white workers would then develop even greater 
animosity toward African Americans. Hoffman insisted that there was 
already evidence that an FEPC would be biased against whites: African 
Americans, he alleged, had held 59 percent of the jobs at the wartime 
agency.35 
Proportionality would also hurt African Americans, some claimed. A 
black worker, Wiley affirmed, should be judged on ability "rather than 
on the basis of some special privilege because of the fact that [he or she] 
is a member of a minority." Hawkes recalled that knowing he could be 
fired at any time, and that he "could not go someplace else and demand a 
job," fueled his determination to succeed. Wiley and other Republicans 
invoked heroic African American figures such as George Washington 
Carver and Booker T. Washington as evidence that self-help was the 
surest path to economic uplift .. The Wisconsin senator spun a folksy tale 
about an anonymous African American man who had wandered across 
the South during the Great Depression and eventually repaired a de-
crepit shack. "That colored man, not by legislation but by work and in-
dustry, did the job," he declared. Hoffman similarly emphasized the 
"marvelous" progress blacks had made since the Civil War, while Sena-
tor Eugene Millikin (Colo.) pointed to the economic success of Euro-
pean immigrants as proof that "we have not done so badly in this 
country." For Republicans, a compulsory FEPC would punish the suc-
cessful, reward the undeserving, and erode African Americans' ambition. 
They saw the United States as a society where any person could rise, 
provided he or she was willing to work diligently.36 
Republicans were not of one mind regarding proportionality, how-
ever. Some cited proportionality itself as the problem, whereas others 
spoke of it in more benign or even favorable language. Intending to show 
that his chemical plants provided equal employment opportunities with-
out federal prodding, Hawkes pointed out that African Americans made 
up 22 percent of the workforce-higher than the percentage of blacks in 
the local population. Taft thought it would be appropriate for an FEPC 
to discuss the types of jobs blacks held, whether they were being used to 
full capacity, and what constituted a "proper proportion" of African 
American workers. During hearings held in 1947, the senator noted that 
[ IS] CHAPTER ONE 
a Firestone plant in Akron, Ohio, had adopted a policy whereby 10 per-
cent of its workforce would be African American. "There should be a re-
lationship between the percentage, the number of people there, and the 
percentage of jobs available," Taft commented. He also noted that dis-
crimination- "not conscious, perhaps, but actual" -often led to a dearth 
of jobs for African Americans. He proposed that a federal commission 
could gather data about employment patterns in a local black population 
and then use that information to lobby executives to boost black em-
ployment. The key was that businesses act voluntarily, not in response to 
federal orders or out of fear of lawsuitsY 
Republican critics often proclaimed discrimination to be morally 
wrong but then defended an individual's right to think and act in such a 
manner. Here, too, the core issue was the protection of individual choice, 
even if such choices were repugnant. An FEPC was yet another danger-
ous attempt, Millikin insisted, to "coerce conformity in human think-
ing." Millikin rejected bigotry, but he vigorously upheld a person's right 
"to give or withhold the use of his enterprise or his premises to those of 
another faith or race." Everyone, Hoffman declared, regularly exhibited 
personal preferences; doing so was simply a part of human nature and 
untouchable by law.38 
Republicans sometimes pushed back against southern Democrats' 
negative views of African Americans. When Senator Allen Ellender (La.) 
linked blacks' morality with criminal behavior, Taft offered a different 
explanation. "1 think that discrimination in employment," the Ohioan 
declared, "makes it very difficult for colored people to make their living 
in honest ways and causes them to turn to crime. "39 
More often than not, however, Republicans sounded like southern 
Democrats. Southern politicians had a long resisted change by alleging 
black inferiority, the evils of racial mixing, and ties between civil rights 
activists and communists. Some reiterated these themes, but they also 
used race-neutral language that trumpeted free enterprise and denounced 
federal power. Senator James Eastland (Miss.) warned that an FEPC 
would result in widespread lawsuits and "bureaucratic control of the 
whole economic life of the United States." The leader of the southern 
bloc in the Senate, Richard Russell (Ga.), predicted that an FEPC would 
lead to discrimination against "the ordinary, garden-variety of American 
FAIR EMPLOYMENT, VOTING RIGHTS, AND RACIAL VIOLENCE [19] 
citizens who are not fortunate enough to associate themselves with some 
minority group." Dixie lawmakers claimed that the region was making 
racial progress and would continue to do so, provided federal authorities 
left it alone. Pushing too hard for racial change, southern politicians 
warned, would lead to friction in the workplace and possibly violence in 
Washington, D.C., and elsewhere.40 
These similarities were not lost on civil rights activists. Carl Murphy, 
editor in chief of the Washington Afro-American, wrote to Taft to de-
nounce his "sissified, emasculated FEPC bill." He pointedly noted, 
"Funny how you and the southern Democrats now sing out of the same 
book." To Murphy and other reformers, it was irrelevant whether Re-
publicans who opposed an FEPC were hiding racial malice or expressing 
sincere convictions about the role of government in business. What mat-
tered was that GOP lawmakers allied with those whom African Ameri-
cans had long regarded as hostile to their progress.41 
Voting Rights 
Civil rights reformers also wanted federal protection for voting rights. 
The Fifteenth Amendment prohibited states from discriminating against 
voters based on race. Other parts of the Constitution, however, gave 
states the authority to determine voter eligibility. Since the late nine-
teenth century, southern states had used ostensibly race-neutral literacy 
tests, the poll tax, manipulation of registration requirements, and vio-
lence or the threat of violence to deny blacks the vote. Dixie leaders in-
sisted that these rules were legitimate attempts to prevent fraud and 
ensure an informed electorate. By 1940, just 3 percent of age-eligible 
African Americans in the South were registered voters. 'Reformers, how-
ever, received a boost in 1944, when the Supreme Court struck down the 
white primary, another device whites had used to maintain powerY 
Civil rights and labor activists demanded that the federal government 
outlaw the poll tax. Since the I920S, several states had abolished this levy, 
but it remained in effect in others. Reformers believed that expanding the 
number of black voters would result in the election of politicians who 
would expand education and other social welfare provisions. Eliminating 
the tax was also part of an effort to change the criminal justice system. 
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Some states selected jurors from rosters of those who had paid the poll 
tax, and all-white juries were notoriously biased-dealing harshly with 
black defendants and often refusing to punish whites who had commit-
ted crimes against African Americans.43 
In I944 Republicans had endorsed a constitutional amendment to 
abolish the poll tax. As far back as Reconstruction, the GOP had exhib-
ited stronger support for guaranteeing political rights than for instituting 
economic reforms. Moreover, the poll tax was a regional issue. Republi-
cans could vote for its repeal knowing that increased federal authority 
would not affect their constituents or change the political dynamics of 
their own states or districts. The GOP's stance put the party at odds with 
the NAACP, which viewed legislation as a quicker route to change. It 
also allied the party with some southern Democrats, who favored a con-
stitutional amendment as a means of delaying or avoiding more far-
reaching electoral reforms.44 
Anti-poll tax legislation had cleared the House, with overwhelming 
Republican support, in I942 and I944, only to die at the hands of a 
southern filibuster in the Senate. The House passed it again in I 94 5, and 
the following summer, southerners filibustered. Truman sat on the side-
lines, and sixteen Republicans (roughly 40 percent of the GOP caucus) 
did not vote on a cloture motion. Wayne Morse called the episode a 
"farce." Walter White, head of the NAACP, lamented that liberals such 
as Morse "still represented a pathetic minority" in "a party dominated by 
the [Robert] Tafts ... and Clare Hoffmans."45 
Republicans in Control 
The I946 election ended the Democrats' thirteen-year control of Con-
gress. Republicans gained fifty-five seats in the House and thirteen in 
the Senate. The GOP performed well everywhere except in the South, 
which had no Republican senators and only two Republicans in the 
House. Racial matters received scant attention; one exception was Cali-
fornia, where voters rejected a proposed state fair employment law by a 
two-to-one margin. As in the I944 Philadelphia transit strike, whites felt 
threatened by the prospect of government action against employment 
discrimination.46 
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Republican leaders attributed the party's improved showing in urban 
areas partly to "a large switch in the colored vote." The NAACP agreed 
that the GOP had registered some gains but chalked them up to blacks' 
frustration with the Democrats rather than support for the Republicans. 
Election results from the North and West had to be interpreted carefully. 
Politicians and pundits (and later, historians) often focused solely on the 
percentage of the black vote for one party or the other, but this might 
distort reality. For example, the percentage of the vote won by a Repub-
lican could rise if a sizable number of African Americans, who generally 
favored Democrats, stayed home. Thus, increased percentages did not 
automatically mean a shift in voters' loyalties.47 
As far as the NAACP and other civil rights activists were concerned, 
Republicans now controlled congressional committees and had the votes 
to pass legislation. But over the next two years, the GOP would exhibit 
little desire to change civil rights policy. 
The Senate immediately faced a controversy involving race and region 
when it convened in January I947. An interracial group from Mississippi 
had called on lawmakers to prevent Theodore Bilbo, a Democrat, from 
taking his seat. A former member of the Ku Klux Klan, Bilbo had 
praised the racial theories of Nazi Germany and regularly denounced 
nonwhite groups as well as Jews. Taft and other senators considered 
Bilbo an embarrassment but defended his right to free speech. By I947, 
however, such naked bigotry had drawn increased fire from the national 
press and liberal activists around the country. Critics found Bilbo's cam-
paign rhetoric from the previous fall particularly egregious. "I'm calling 
on every red-blooded American who believes in the superiority and in-
tegrity of the white race to get out and make sure that no nigger votes," 
he had declared, "and the best time to do that is the night before!" A 
Senate investigation revealed that black voters in Mississippi often en-
countered white violence. The three Democrats on the committee 
cleared Bilbo of responsibility, but the two Republicans concluded that 
he had abused his right to free speech. Senate Republicans agreed with 
their two colleagues, although legislators postponed a final decision 
about Bilbo's status owing to his poor health. The senator, who was suf-
fering from throat cancer, died in August.48 
Civil rights activists were happy that Bilbo was out of the Senate, but 
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they were more concerned with the FEPC, voting rights, and a federal 
antilynching law. Murder and other forms of violence were state crimes, 
and all-white juries in the South would not punish white perpetrators, 
some of whom did not even face trial. Activists had been fighting for fed-
erallegislation, with assistance from some Republicans, for nearly thirty 
years. Several antilynching bills had passed in the House, only to die in 
the Senate, where opponents in both parties warned against expanding 
federal authority. Lynching had declined since its peak in the early 19oos, 
but a wave of violence against blacks had swept the South in 1946. A 
mob of twenty whites murdered two African American farmworkers 
and their wives in Georgia, and Isaac Woodward, a black veteran, was 
blinded by whites in South Carolina. In the spring of 1947, thirty-one 
whites escaped punishment for their involvement in the murder of Willie 
Earle, a twenty-four-year old resident of South Carolina. Some of the 
men had signed confessions or identified the man who had pulled the 
trigger.49 
Congress showed little interest. House Judiciary Committee chair 
Earl Michener (Mich.) refused to move on antilynching legislation, not-
ing that he could be reelected without the votes of those who favored it. 
Citing a lengthy committee agenda, he argued that there was little point 
in acting on a bill that was certain to fail in the Senate.50 
An FEPC remained reformers' top priority. The Crisis editorialized in 
February, "If the GOP's heart really bleeds for the Negro as they say it 
does, if they really want him to come home to the party of Lincoln, they 
might try passing an effective FEPC bill." Opponents continued to allege 
that a compulsory FEPC would mean that the government could force 
employers to hire someone. Ives retorted that it was the "exact antithe-
sis" of that approach. He and a small bipartisan group rallied behind a 
modified bill, but Republicans helped ensure that FEPC legislation re-
mained stalled in committee in both houses of CongressY 
Other reforms suffered similar fates. Although a handful of Senate Re-
publicans agreed with civil rights leaders' demand for majority cloture, 
GOP members of the Rules Committee helped kill such a proposal. 
House Republicans overwhelmingly lined up behind anti-poll tax legis-
lation, but GOP leaders brought it up near the end of the congressional 
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session, which left no time for success in the Senate. Some Republicans 
confessed that this move was in part payback against southern Demo-
crats, who had recently helped sustain Truman's veto of a GOP tax-
reduction measure. Republicans focused their attention in I947 on cutting 
taxes and curbing the power of unions. Civil rights was not a priority. 52 
The Republican American Committee (RAC), an organization of ap-
proximately 200 African Americans, gathered in Philadelphia that Au-
gust. Robert R. Church Jr., a Memphis businessman who had long been 
prominent in local and national Republican politics, headed the group. 
Church was also active in the local branch of the NAACP and was a 
close friend of Randolph, who had persuaded him to join the board of 
the National Council for a Permanent Fair Employment Practices Com-
mittee. The RAC warned Republican leaders, "The Colored voter will 
not be deceived by legislative jockeying, buck-passing and double-talk." 
A compulsory FEPC, along with antilynching and anti-poll tax legisla-
tion, the committee predicted, would improve the GOP's electoral 
prospects. 53 
Democrats, meanwhile, worked to retain African Americans' loyalty. 
In February 1948 Truman sent a package of civil rights measures to Con-
gress. These included a compulsory FEPC, anti-poll tax and antilynch-
ing legislation, a commission to investigate racial problems and educate 
the public, and a bill to end discrimination in interstate transportation. 
Truman usually stayed out of the legislative fray, but he now had several 
reasons to get off the sidelines. The president was personally troubled by 
the violence against blacks in the South, and he wished to burnish the na-
tion's image abroad to gain supporters in the emerging struggle with the 
Soviet Union for global influence. Given his low public approval rating, 
Truman also hoped to inspire blacks to turn out for him in November.54 
Though Church told GOP lawmakers that a compulsory FEPC 
would mean "better housing, food for the table, [and] shoes for the 
baby," Republicans in both houses were unmoved. Some talked about 
passing antilynching and anti-poll tax bills, but there was little enthusi-
asm for either. As the end of the session neared, The Crisis declared that 
the Republican Congress "has produced a big fat zero as far as the Negro 
is concerned. "55 
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Race and Republican Politics 
Republicans were in a buoyant mood when they assembled that June to 
select a presidential candidate. Truman remained decidedly unpopular, 
and Democrats were divided. Henry Wallace, who had been vice presi-
dent from 1941 to 1945 and then secretary of commerce under Truman 
until September 1946, had formed the Progressive Party. He attacked 
Truman as too conservative on civil rights and other matters. Southern 
Democrats, meanwhile, thought the president was too liberal. A Repub-
lican victory in November appeared certain.56 
New York governor Thomas E. Dewey bested Taft to capture the 
GOP nomination. Dewey personified the liberal, eastern wing of the 
party. Compared with their conservative colleagues, who were based 
largely in the Midwest and West, liberals favored a more active role for 
government in the economy and a more internationalist foreign policy. 
Republicans, they believed, had to adapt to a changing world if they 
wanted to regain power. A former prosecutor, Dewey had become gover-
nor in 1942 and then lost the 1944 presidential election to Roosevelt. 
Two years later, he was reelected governor by the largest margin in New 
York history. His success in the nation's most populous state, a Demo-
cratic stronghold, appeared to bode well for the GOP. Intelligent, 
efficient, and ambitious, Dewey conveyed an image of executive compe-
tence, but critics found him too reserved and uninspiring.57 
Though Dewey had drawn fire from some civil rights activists, he had 
a stronger record on race than any governor of his era. He had, despite 
some private reservations, backed New York's compulsory FEPC and 
named several African Americans to prominent posts. In the fall of 1945 
he had condemned the banning of an African American singer from a 
Washington, D.C., concert hall. Two months prior to the 1948 conven-
tion he had signed a bill outlawing discrimination in higher education. 
Some of Truman's advisers worried that the governor might bring a siz-
able number of black voters back to the GOP. Dewey's racial views, 
however, were not a significant factor in his nomination.58 
Dewey chose another liberal, Governor Earl Warren of California, as 
his running mate. Warren had favored a voluntary FEPC in his state, but 
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the plan died in the legislature. He supported the desegregation of pris-
ons, even though white guards threatened to riot. Warren also endorsed 
the state attorney general's stand against restrictive covenants, which 
prohibited the sale of property to racial minorities, thus maintaining 
neighborhood segregation. Nevertheless, Warren had fared poorly 
among black voters in the 1942 and 1946 gubernatorial elections. This 
pattern would recur frequently for Republican liberals in the post-
World War II era.59 
At the convention, Republicans paid little attention to African Ameri-
cans or their concerns. Former Connecticut congresswoman Clare 
Booth Luce denounced "lynch loving Bourbons, [and] white-shirted 
race supremacists of the Bilbo ilk," but other speakers, including Dewey, 
ignored race. A coalition of twenty-one black organizations, whose 
membership numbered more than 6 million, sent representatives to 
Philadelphia. African Americans, they informed the Platform Commit-
tee, were "deeply disappointed" that the Republican-controlled Con-
gress had failed to pass civil rights legislation. "The elephant never 
forgets-or learns," one dejected member of the group told GOP lead-
ers. The activists had no impact, however. Hoping to woo disaffected 
southern Democrats, the GOP replaced specific civil rights language 
with more generic wording. Randolph called the plank "lousy" and 
charged that the party had sunk "to its lowest depths of opportunism."60 
African American delegates stood on the margins of party affairs. 
They complained that southern delegations, which had once been major-
ity black, were becoming increasingly "lily white." Blacks felt excluded 
from important meetings as well as social occasions. Some grew irate 
when the Platform Committee refused to hear an African American 
lobby for a ten-point civil rights program. Walter White similarly blasted 
the GOP for its lack of urgency about racial injustice and for treating 
blacks in a patronizing manner.61 
Truman, meanwhile, moved to the left. In late July the president 
signed executive orders desegregating the military and outlawing em-
ployment discrimination by the federal government. Calling Congress 
back into a monthlong special session that August, he challenged the 
GOP to support his February civil rights proposals. Despite appeals 
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from high-ranking officials in the Dewey campaign to back something, 
Republican leaders showed little enthusiasm. A southern filibuster killed 
an anti-poll tax bill. 62 
Republicans looked to the South as potentially fertile ground. The 
GOP had been trying since the early twentieth century to crack the De-
mocrats' lock on Dixie. Herbert Hoover had won four Upper South 
states in 1928, plus Florida and Texas, but since 1932, every former Con-
federate state had supported Roosevelt. Although the South benefited 
enormously from federal spending during the New Deal and World War 
II, by the late 1930S, increasing numbers of whites perceived the federal 
government as a threat to the racial status quo, and they considered the 
Democratic Party too beholden to northern interests, including labor 
unions and the racial and ethnic groups that populated urban areas.63 
The Democrats' convention exacerbated these sectional divisions. Led 
by Hubert Humphrey, then the mayor of Minneapolis, northern liberals 
fought for and achieved a strong civil rights plank. Some southern dele-
gates walked out in protest. They joined other irate southerners to form 
the States' Rights Democratic Party (known as the Dixiecrats), which 
nominated South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond for president. 
Preservation of white supremacy constituted the core of the Dixiecrats' 
efforts.64 
Prominent Republicans reached out to the South. Dewey's aides reas-
sured southern leaders that the governor would not "throw the book" of 
civil rights at the South. Harold Stassen, the former governor of Min-
nesota, told an audience in Charlotte, North Carolina, that Dewey 
would find "intelligent compromise between states' rights and human 
rights which would satisfy Dixie." Appealing to white voters in Florida 
and Tennessee, Taft emphasized fiscal conservatism and limited govern-
ment and spoke of a "basic agreement between the Southern Democrats 
and the Republican Party." (The senator had been eying the South for 
years. In 1946 he had privately noted that "the Republican Party would 
be willing to do anything to effect a union with the Southern Demo-
crats" if the Democrats fractured along regional lines; he did not con-
sider this likely, however, and indicated that the GOP had "a much better 
chance" of winning northern black votes than southern white votes.) Taft 
now predicted that Dewey would do well in several southern states and 
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might even carry Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Florida. Pun-
dits observed that Republicans were making their most active play for 
southern support in decades.65 
A few Republicans urged vigorous pursuit of the black vote. They 
embraced the theory-first articulated by W. E. B. DuBois and then re-
peated by Walter White and other black leaders for years-that northern 
African Americans constituted the "balance of power" in a presidential 
election. Blacks' support for Roosevelt had always been stronger than 
their support for other Democrats. Francis Rivers, an African American 
adviser to Dewey, counseled the governor to get behind civil rights legis-
lation and campaign aggressively in black areas. But the GOP nominee 
faced an uphill fight: 1948 was the first year that a majority of African 
Americans identified as Democrats. Fifty-six percent lined up with the 
party of FDR, and just 25 percent proclaimed loyalty to the GOP. Eight 
years earlier, blacks had been split evenly, with 42 percent for each major 
party.66 
Certain of victory, Dewey ran a bland, cautious campaign. Although 
he enjoyed the backing of several prominent African American newspa-
pers, he said little about race and largely ignored black voters; few 
African Americans attended his rallies. The GOP pointed to Dewey's 
record in New York as proof that the Republicans offered meaningful 
action, whereas the Democrats were simply a party of words. Republi-
cans also warned that voting Democratic would allow southerners to re-
gain control of important congressional committees. These themes 
would reappear frequently in decades to come.67 
Meanwhile, Truman had a few cards to play. He benefited from 
blacks' identification with the Democratic Party, and he proved adept at 
convincing black voters that he was their ally. The president had spoken 
out against racial injustice, submitted civil rights legislation, and signed 
two important executive orders to promote equality in the federal gov-
ernment. His Committee on Civil Rights, created in 1946, had tried to 
educate the public about the evils of racism. During the fall campaign, 
Truman became the first president to stump for votes in Harlem.68 
Truman won a stunning come-from-behind victory, and the Democrats 
regained control of Congress. The president's triumph was attributable 
to the backing of several constituencies, but overwhelming African 
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American support in the pivotal states of California, Illinois, and Ohio 
was instrumental. Had Dewey received even slightly more black votes in 
two of those states, he would have won. Dewey did not receive a major-
ity of black votes in any of the eighteen states surveyed by the NAACP. 
Truman was so popular among blacks in New York that Dewey received 
fewer African American votes there in 1948 than he had in 1944.69 
The GOP fared poorly in Dixie. White southerners stayed loyal to 
Truman or, in the Deep South, backed Thurmond. Although Dewey lost 
every southern state, he received more total votes in 1948 than he had in 
1944. Most of the gain came from Texas, Virginia, and Florida, which 
would be among the first southern states to drift to the GOP in the near 
future. Dewey received less than 5 percent of the vote in Mississippi and 
South Carolina. Republicans' share of the major party congressional vote 
in the South fell from 17.4 percent in 1946 to 12.6 percent. 70 
New Congress, Same Results 
Civil rights activists renewed their drive to reform the filibuster when 
Congress convened in January. The three-month battle ended when the 
Senate easily approved a plan by Nebraska Republican Kenneth Wherry, 
the minority leader, that forbade a filibuster on motions to take up a bill; 
required two-thirds of the entire Senate (sixty-four votes) instead of 
two-thirds of those present and voting, for cloture; and prohibited clo-
ture on a fiJibuster against motions to change the rules. GOP lawmakers 
backed the proposal by a four-to-one margin. Morse blasted his fellow 
Republicans for entering "an unholy political marriage with southern re-
actionaries." Another disgusted Republican commented, "I wonder why 
every Negro in the United States doesn't turn communist." The Crisis 
accused the GOP of "a sellout," and the Afro-American newspaper chain 
said it had erred in endorsing Dewey.71 
Though the new filibuster rule made passing civil rights legislation 
more difficult, reformers pressed ahead. In January 1950 the NAACP 
and sixty labor, civil rights, civic, and religious groups held a National 
Emergency Mobilization rally in Washington, D.C. Four thousand dele-
gates from thirty-three states attended, and their leaders proclaimed that 
an FEPC was their first priority. Congressional Republicans were un-
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moved. When Senate Majority Leader Scott Lucas (D-Ill.) called for a 
civil rights test on a compulsory FEPC, Wherry stressed antilynching 
legislation. The Nebraska Republican agreed that some sort of an FEPC 
was needed but noted that because Americans were "a tolerant people, 
fair and just," a compulsory approach would be too harsh.72 
House leaders moved forward on a voluntary FEPC bill sponsored by 
Republican Samuel McConnell of Pennsylvania-the first time any 
FEPC bill had been brought to a vote in either house of Congress. Mc-
Connell's legislation revealed the depth of concern over the use of statis-
tical evidence to gauge discrimination. It stated that a person lacking 
skills did not deserve a job because of his or her race and that low levels 
of employment among a particular racial or ethnic group did not prove 
discrimination. After blocking a compulsory bill, Republicans lined up 
behind the McConnell plan, which passed. 73 
There was no chance that an FEPC bill would be approved in the Sen-
ate. Two cloture votes failed to halt a southern filibuster. Although a 
solid majority of Republicans backed cloture in each case, civil rights 
leaders were not impressed. Many of the Republicans who favored clo-
ture opposed a compulsory bill. H. Alexander Smith feared that a com-
pulsory FEPC would exacerbate racial tensions in the South, forcing the 
president to send federal troops to restore order. NAACP lobbyist 
Clarence Mitchell complained that the GOP was more interested in us-
ing civil rights to embarrass the Democrats than in passing necessary 
bills. "We must try," he advised, "to place the Republicans in such a posi-
tion when civil rights issues come to the fore they will not ... back down 
or run out on us. "74 
Mitchell and other civil rights activists would have no success doing 
so during the last two years of the Truman administration. Senators rves 
and Humphrey offered a modified compulsory FEPC bill that granted 
more state and local autonomy, but it went nowhere. Alarmed by vio-
lence in the South against black veterans, a bipartisan group of legislators 
proposed to make it a federal crime to murder, assault, or intimidate 
members of the armed services. The Senate, including a majority of Re-
publicans, rejected that proposal. Other civil rights bills remained stuck 
in committee. An attempt to liberalize the cloture rule in 1951 also 
failed. 75 
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Race, Region, and Electoral Strategy 
The GOP's unexpected defeat in 1948 sparked intense debates over the 
party's future. Democrats had won five consecutive presidential contests 
and controlled both houses of Congress for all but two years since 1932. 
Some Republicans contended that taking a more liberal stand on civil 
rights would help remedy these problems. Robert Church Jr. highlighted 
the party's failure to push for civil rights legislation and reminded RNC 
officials that they had ignored the 1938 recommendation of Ralph 
Bunche, a prominent African American intellectual and civil rights ac-
tivist, to appoint more blacks to leadership positions. Party leaders in 
Cincinnati stressed that it was time for the GOP to stop talking about its 
role in passing Reconstruction-era constitutional amendments that pro-
vided legal protections for blacks. Ives, Morse, and others trumpeted 
more recent accomplishments, such as the 1949 election of Alfred 
Driscoll, a racial liberal, as governor of New Jersey.76 
But it was questionable whether the North was as progressive as the 
Republicans contended. The same year Driscoll was elected, Republican 
Albert Cobo won the mayoral contest in heavily Democratic Detroit, 
partly by vowing to protect whites from neighborhood integration. Over 
the next several years, he would remain popular among his white con-
stituents by ensuring that public housing projects, where many African 
Americans resided, would not be built in their neighborhoods.77 
Most Republicans continued to either ignore or downplay racial is-
sues. In May 1949 the RNC identified twelve policy objectives that 
could propel the GOP to electoral success. Civil rights did not make the 
list. Party leaders failed to invite any black Republicans to a January 1950 
meeting to discuss how the GOP might improve its showing among 
African Americans. A month later, House Republicans released a state-
ment of principles that contained a promise to "continue to sponsor and 
support legislation to protect the rights of minorities." Ives, Javits, and 
other liberals found this wording far too tepid. The Crisis observed, 
"Judging Republican performance, we conclude that the Party no longer 
regards itself as the 'friend' of the Negro."78 
Other Republicans openly challenged the liberals' prescription. Hoff-
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man declared that Republicans were "barking up the wrong tree" if they 
believed supporting civil rights would garner more black support. The 
African American vote had been irrevocably lost, he claimed. Hoffman 
echoed the theme of the "bought vote," a derisive concept employed by 
some Republicans since the 1930S to argue that Democrats rallied voters, 
including African Americans, through lavish federal spending. The 1950 
election provided evidence to support Hoffman's view. Among the New 
Deal coalition, no one remained more loyal to the Democrats than 
African Americans did.79 
Some Republicans favored an aggressive pursuit of white votes in 
Dixie. A month after the 1950 election, RNC chair Guy Gabrielson 
lamented that conceding the South had left the GOP with a big electoral 
vote deficit. He stressed that such an obstacle "might not have been too 
serious ... when we had solid Republican states north of the Mason-
Dixon line, but some of those states that were at one time very solidly 
Republican are now becoming marginal areas, and if we are going to 
build towards a stronger Republican Party that can carry a national elec-
tion we must do some effective and constructive work south of the Ma-
son-Dixon line." The Democrats' success since the 1930S in northern 
industrial states, once solid Republican territory, had altered the political 
landscape.so 
Other RNC members agreed. "There are certain definite changes in 
our political horizons that an alert party must consider," one empha-
sized. "The South and the Southwest are the last remaining political 
frontiers for conquest by the Republican Party, to make up its losses in 
other sections of the country," said another. In December 1950 the RNC 
passed a resolution to create a seven-member committee to boost the 
party's fortunes in Dixie. A month later one committee member pre-
sciently forecast that Republicans might succeed in 1952 in Florida and 
the Upper South, but he also stressed that the party needed to organize 
throughout the region. Because building viable organizations might take 
two decades or longer, he pointed out, Republicans should start immedi-
ately.Sl 
Clifford Case, a civil rights liberal, worried that his GOP colleagues 
were about to seek the support of racist whites in the South. This would 
[ 32 ] C HAPT E R ON E 
be futile and a "betrayal of our heritage," the New Jersey congressman 
stressed. Predicting that segregation's days were numbered, Case urged 
the GOP to cultivate nascent progressive constituencies in agriculture, 
labor, and industry. For Case, the party's future in Dixie involved attract-
ing new voters rather than seeking Democratic crossovers. He also be-
lieved that allying with segregationists would worsen the GOP's 
standing in the North. Dewey's margins of victory in New York, Michi-
gan, and Pennsylvania had been perilously thin in 1948, he observed, and 
trading those electoral vote-rich states for the relatively sparsely popu-
lated South would be foolish. Other northern Republicans would make 
essentially the same argument over the next twenty-five years.82 
Conclusion 
Inspired by the New Deal and World War II, African Americans worked 
to enlist the federal government in their struggle for equal employment 
opportunity, the right to vote, protection from violence, and several 
other areas. Liberals' hopes that the postwar era would revive New 
Deal-style domestic reform, including progress on racial issues, went un-
fulfilled. Southern Democrats effectively defended the status quo, but so 
did Republicans. The GOP helped tighten the filibuster rule and firmly 
opposed a compulsory FEPC-the item of greatest importance to civil 
rights activists - as well as other civil rights legislation. Republicans' 
rhetoric often echoed that of southern Democrats, and Thomas Dewey 
largely ignored black voters in the 1948 presidential election. African 
Ameri~ans often criticized Democrats, but they stayed loyal in part be-
cause Republicans did not offer an attractive alternative. 
Most Republicans resisted demands for change by reiterating nine-
teenth-century notions of freedom of contract, upward mobility through 
hard work, class harmony, property rights, and localism. Anticommu-
nism played a role, but it was a secondary concern. Politically, most Re-
publicans saw little electoral incentive to pursue black voters. Those who 
favored a stronger federal role in racial matters or those who wanted to 
bring African Americans back to the GOP were few in number and 
powerless in Congress and the party.83 
As the Truman era drew to a close, Republicans looked forward to the 
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1952 presidential campaign, the first in nearly two decades without an 
incumbent Democratic president seeking reelection. The political winds 
seemed to be at their back. Voters had grown weary of the Korean War, 
and Democrats remained sharply divided over race and other issues. Re-
publicans, meanwhile, thought they had identified the man who would 
restore the GOP's claim on the White House. 
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